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COMMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF LATERAL SUPPORT IN. NEW YORK
The law of lateral support conveniently divides itself into two main parts:
the right to lateral support of land in its natural or unimproved state, and the
right of lateral support when the land has been improved by the erection of
buildings or other structures. Little or no controversy exists in regard to the
rights, duties, and liabilities existing in the first field. Confusion and conflict
exist in the second. The purpose herein is to consider the New York case law
on the latter topic, but in order to do so it is necessary to review the basic
principles involved.
Unimproved Land
At common law, if A is the owner of an unimproved lot, and B, an adjoining
owner, so excavates on his land as to cause A's land to subside or slide into the
excavation causing A substantial damage,' it is well settled that A may recover
for such damage from ,B.2 This is true although B has-conducted his operations
1. In order to maintain an action for. loss of lateral support, substantial damage must
have been incurred thereby, Smith v. Thackerah, [1866] L. R. 1 C. P. 564. Unlike an
action for trespass to real property nominal damages are not recoverable. The reason for
the rule is apparent. Damage is a part of the right. The act by which a landowner suffers
loss of lateral support originates not on his land, but on the land of another; such owner
has the right to use bis land in any manner he chooses, so long as the adjoining landowner
suffers no material injury thereby. Thus the landowner must show substantial injury before he establishes a cause of action. Smith v. Thackerah supra. A suitable maxim to fit
the situation herein involved might be de minimis non curat lex. A landowner must suffer
the minor inconveniences incident to the occupancy and use of adjoining lands.
2. Wilde v. Ministerly, 15 Car. 1 cited in 2 Rol. Ab. 564 (perhaps the earliest known case
affirming the existence of this right) ; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (1877) ; Braun v.
Hamack, 206 Minn. 572, 289 N. W. 553 (1940). Where the acts of a party in excavating
make damage to the adjoining soil of his neighbor imminent through loss of necessary
support, an injunction will lie to prevent further excavation. Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb.
380 (N. Y. 1853) aff'd 21 Barb. 409 (N. Y. 1855). Contra Lasala v. Holbrook 4 Paige 169
(N. Y. 1833) wherein the court dissolved an injunction granted to prevent excavations
because of imminent danger of damage to the adjoining buildings. Most cases, however,
restrict such injunctive relief to the situation where the excavation has already caused
damage and continuing excavation will cause more. Trowbridge v. True, 52 Conn. 190, 52
Am. Rep. 579 (1884); Simon v. Nance, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 480, 100 S. W. 1038 (1907). It is
not necessary for a wrongdoer to -be the owner of the land upon which he excavates. An
action will lie if he is a lessee. Mamer v. Lussem, 65 Ill. 484 (1872); or licensee, Gilmore v.
Driscoll, supra; Wahl v. Kelly, 194 Wis. 559, 217 N. W. 307 (1928). Nor is it necessary
that the land, whereon the act depriving another of lateral support to his land is done,
immediately adjoin the injured party's land. An action will lie against a wrongdoer excavating on any land within the "natural zone of support." Home Brewing Co. v. Thomas
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3
with all the foresight, ingenuity and care that human experience can dictate,
the theory of the action being that A has a natural right, attaching to, and by
virtue of, the ownership of his land.4 A cannot-legally be deprived of the
natural support of his land by any act of an adjoining owner. Hence, his right
of lateral support gives rise to an absolute liability for loss or damage to the
adjoining land without proof of negligence or want of care. 5

Improbed Land and the Doctrine of Prete v. Cray
Assume that A constructs a house or other improvement 6 upon this unimproved lot; that B thereafter excavates and as a result A's land subsides causing damage to his building. What are the rights of the parties?
It is substantially settled law that if the weight of the improvement caused
or contributed to the subsidence there is no liability for damage to either
Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 56, 117 AtI. 542 (1922); Murray v. Pannaci, 64 N. J. Eq. 147, 53
At. 595 (1902).
3. "... for any injury to his soil resulting from the removal of the natural support to
which it is entitled, by means of exca~ation on an adjoining tract, the owner has a legal
remedy in an action at law against the party by whom the work has been done .... This
does not depend upon negligence or unskillfulness, but upon the violation of a right of
property which has been invaded and disturbed." Foley v. Wyeth, 84 Mass. 131, 133
(1861); Braun v. Hamack, 206 Minn. 572, 289 N. W. 553 (1940).
4. Some controversy exists as to whether the right to lateral support is a natural right
incident to the oywnership of land, Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige 168 (N. Y. 1833); Levine
v. City of New York, 290 N. Y. Supp. 953 (2d Dep't 1936); or an easement "arising by
natural right", WALSH, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 647; or a right "analogous to" an
easement, Carrig v. Andrews, 127 Conn. 403, 407, 17 A. (2d) 520, 522 (1941). The better
view would seem to be the first. There is no benefit or interest in another's property,
but rather a right of the owner to have his land left in its natural state. The exact term
to be applied to the right is academic in the case of damages to land in its natural- state,
caused by reason of the deprivation of support by an adjoining owner. As Professor Walsh
states ". . . the term applied to [lateral support] is of no great importance, [its] nature
being understood." Walsh, loc. cit. supra.
5.- Levine v. City of New York, 290 N. Y. Supp. 953 (2d Dep't 1936). The duty imposed by the right to lateral support is therefore a negative one, a duty not to do any
act which will impair one's neighbor's lateral support, rather than an affirmative duty to
maintain it. In a recent case where natural forces, caused excavations on defendant's land
as a result of which plaintiff's land was deprived of lateral support it was held that defendant was not liable, being under no duty to refurnish lateral. support removed by an
agency beyond his control. Carrig v. Andrews, 127 Conn. 403, 17 A. (2d) 520 (1940).
6. Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich. 431, 67 N. W. 519 (1896); 3 TIrAwy, REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 753. Shrubbery and fences are improvements [Gilmore v. Driscoll,
122 Mass. 199 (1877)] as well as a fruit orchard [Langhorne v. Turman, 141 Ky. 809,
133 S.W. 1008 (1911). See also 2 RESTATEN[ENT, TORTS § 363, Comment b, for a discussion of the meaning of "natural condition of land". Cf. Noel, Nuisances From Land In Its
Natural Condition (1943) 56 HAav. L. REv. 772
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land or building in the absence of negligence. 7 Likewise, if the improvement
did not cause or contribute to the subsidence there is liability for such damage
to the land in so far as it is in its natural state, irrespective of negligence. 8
Conflict arises upon the question as to whether id the latter case there is also
absolute liability for the injury to the buildings and improvements. 9
The case of Prete v. Cray 0 presented the last question. The defendant was
the treasurer of the City of Providence, R. I., which had, as the court held, in
the exercise of a corporate function, dug trenches in the street upon which the
plaintiff's house and lot abutted. This land rested on quicksand which, despite
excessive precautions by tie city, flowed into the trench and caused the plaintiff's land with the buildings thereon to subside. The weight of the buildings
in no way contributed to the sinking. The Supreme Court, in affirming a
judgment for the plaintiff, held, one judge dissenting, that the defendant,
although there was concededly no negligence proven, was liable for damage
to both land and superstructures. The court based its decision upon the theory
that when the land subsided of its own weight as a result of the defendant's
act, the plaintiff's natural right to lateral support had been infringed. Being
guilty therefore of this wrong, the city was liable for all the natural and probable consequences of it, which included the injury to the building."
7. The right is one to the support of land in its natural state. It would follow that
damage proximately caused by reason of the land not being in its natural state, would
not be recoverable as a violation of the right since the right could not then exist by very
definition. See Young v. Mall Investment Co., 172 Minn. 428, 215 N. W. 840 (1927);
'Neyman v. Pincus, 82 Mont. 467, 267 Pac. 805 (1928).
8. Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich. 431, 67 N. W. 519 (1896), restated in Bissell
v. Ford, 176 Mich. 69, 141 N. W. 860 (1913); Wahl v. Kelly, 194 Wis. 559, 217 N. W.
307 (1928). The reasoning behind this rule is apparent. If the duty is to land in its
natural state, and if no artificial construction or improvement has added to the lateral
pressure, the least recovery to be allowed must include damage to the land in so far as it
is in its natural state.
9. The right of lateral support to land may be negatived by contract, express or implied, or by the relation of parties. If land is conveyed with the reservation that the grantor
may dig upon the adjoining land, such reservation will destroy the grantee's right to lateral
support. Ryckman v. Gillis, 57 N. Y. 68 (1874). The relation of landlord and tenant may
similarly curtail this right. In Beauchamp v. Excelsior Brick Co., 143 App. Div. 48,
127 N. Y. Supp. 686 (2d Dep't 1911) the defendant leased land to the plaintiff, adjoining a pit dug by the defendant. The plaintiff knew of this pit which was not increased
in depth after the making of the lease. The court denied the plaintiff recovery for the subsidence which damaged the leased property.
10. 49 R. I. 209, 141 At. 609 (1928).
11. ". . . and under the general principle that a wrongdoer must make compensation
in damages for all the direct results of his wrongdoing, B is entitled to recover compensation for the injury to his building solely because it is a part of his damage for the actionable wrong which A has committed." Prete v. Cray, 49 R. I. 209, 214, 141 At. 609 (1928).

COMMENTS
The court in deciding this case said that the rule which they were enunciating
had been developed by a line of English cases.' 2 These cases squarely held the
proposition that a landowner may retover damages for consequential injuries
to his buildings when his land has been deprived of lateral support, provided
that the improvements did not contribute to the subsidence of the land. Brown
v. Robins,'1 one of the cases cited, was clearly in point on its facts. The plaintiff's land had subsided by reason ot mining operations conducted by the
defendant on adjoining land. The plaintiff recovered for the damage to his
buildings which was caused by the subsidence. There was no finding of negligence. The court said, "But the moment the jury found that the subsidence
of the land was not caused by the weight of the superincumbent buildings, the
existence of the house became unimportant in considering the question of the
defendant's liability. [It] resolves itself into this, that the land was injurel;
and the house was considered by the learned Judge solely with reference to
the amount of the damages." 14
A number of American decisions were cited, two of them New York cases. 15
Of the others, only two
were in point. 16 Prete v. Cray, then, may not be said
!
12.

Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 213, 141 Adt. 609 (1928). Accord: 11

ENGLMD (2d ed.) § 640; JoNas, EASEMNTS (1898)

-

HALSBURY's LAWS OF

§ 620.

13. [1859] 4 H. & N. 186, 193, 157 Eng. Rep. Repr. 809.
14. [1859] 4 H. &N. 186, 193, 157 Eng. Rep. Repr. at 812; Accord: Stroyan v. Kn6wles,
6 H. & N. 454, 158 Eng. Rep. Repr. 186 (1861).
15. Riley v. Continuous Rail Joint Co., 110 App. Div. 787, 97 N. Y. Supp. 283
(3d Dep't, 1906), affirmed without opinion; 193 N. Y. 643, 86 N. E. 1132 (1908) which was
some authority for the proposition and will be subsequently discussed, and Booth v. Rome,
W. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893) which had no bearing on the
subject, the question being whether damages could be recovered for injury to a building
caused by a blasting concussion, in the absence of negligence. The court in discussing the
plinciple of damnum absque injuria adverted to the doctrine of lateral support by way of
example and said that there could be no recovery, for instance, where as a result of excavation, conducted in a careful manner the buildings of an adjoining owner are injured "provided the weight of the building caused the land on which it stood to give way." Id. at
275, 35 N. E. at 595. It must be noted that the sentence quoted above is pure dictum,
and was repeated by way of analogy in a case which involved no problem of lateral
support whatsoever.
16. This fact was pointed out in the dissenting opinion. 49 R. I. 209, 223, 141 Ad.
609, 615 (1928). The two American decisions which were in point, besides the Riley case were:
Stearns' Ex'r. v. Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847 (1892) and Farnandis v. Great
Northern R. Co., 41 Wash. 486, 84 Pac. 18 (1906). The remainder of the American cases
cited, like Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893), were
blasting cases in which the analogy to lateral support is remote.
Prete v. Cray has been cited and followed with approval in Bator v. Ford Motor Co.,
269 Mich. 648, 257 N. W. 906 (1934) and Muskatell v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. (2d)
221, 116 P. (2d) 363 (1941).
In Welsh Mfg. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 61 R. I. 359, 200 Adt. 981 (1938) the court, while dis-
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to have introduced an entirely new principle into the law of lateral support in
the United States, 17 but it was the first case which clearly expounded the rationale of the doctrine for which it stood. It was, and still is, the rule of the
majority that there can be no recovery for damage to buildings in the absence
8
of negligence.'
The court said that there could be another basis for allowing recovery (if a
different form of action were brought), namely, the City's liability for drawing
off the subjacent support. A recovery based on this line of reasoning would
be in accord with the majority view.' 9
The Doctrine of Prete v. Cray and the Law of New York
As stated above, Prete v. Cray relied on the case of Riley v. The Continuous
Rail Joint Co. 20 which on similar facts held the same proposition. The plaintiff's land slid into an excavation made by the defendant, an adjoining owner,
and the plaintiff's buildings were injured by the subsidence of the land. The
court allowed damages for the decrease in the value of the realty or for the
cost of the repair, whichever was the smaller sum. The damage sustained by
the buildings was included in the amount recovered. Thus, upon its facts, the
case is in accord with Prete v. Cray. While the court did say ". . . there is no
evidence in this case that the buildings ... were a burden thereon in any way
tinguishing this case from Prete v. Cray, quotes from the Prete case and reaffirms the
holding of that case as the law of Rhode Island. When the Welsh case was up on appeal
the second time, 61 R. I. 469, 1 A. (2d) 95 (1938), the court again stated that Prete v.
Cray is still the law of Rhode Island and that it will be followed should similar circumstances arise. The point on which the Welsh case was distinguished from Prete v. 'Cray
was that in the former case there had been no clear proof that the improvement had not
added to the lateral pressure and did not contribute to the subsidence of the land in any
other way.
17. Ladd v. Philadelphia, 171 Pa. St. 485 (1895); see also Steams' Ex'r v. Richmond,
88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847 (1892); Farnandis v. Great Northern R. Co., 41 Wash. 486,
84 Pac. 18 (1906).
18. Scranton Coal Co. v. Graff Furnace Co., 289 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind. 195, 22 N. E. 989 (1889); Altoona Concrete Const. Co. v.
Cooper, 231 Pa. 557, 80 At]. 1047 (1911); Triulzi v. Costa, 296 Mass. 24, 4 N. E. (2d)
617 (1936). It must be stated, however, that in many cases cited as contra to Prete v.
Cray the problem as to whether the land would have subsided even had there been no
buildings thereon is not discussed. See also (1929) 77 U. or PA. L. REv. 405 for the
authorities in accord with or contra to the rulings in Prete v. Cray and an evaluation
of their soundness; (1935_)
19 MiNN. L. REV. 587. Cf. Comment (1940) 14 TEmPLE

L. Q. 243.
19. Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 44 N. E. 344 (1896); see also Forbell v. City
of New York, 164 N. Y. 522 (1900); Comment (1935) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 377. The
reason for the more liberal rule in respect to the withdrawal of su'bjacent support is
that such a withdrawal constitutes a trespass upon the wronged party's land.
20. 110 App. Div. 787, 97 N. Y. Supp. 283. aff'd, 193 N. Y. 643, 86 N. E. 1132.
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increasing the lateral pressure at the line between the lands of plaintiff and
defendant", 2 ' it did not discuss the reasons for making a holding which was so
novel. It occupies a somewhat indecisive position in the New York law since
it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion.2 2 At the very least
it clarified the confusion as to whether there was any absolute right to lateral
support whatsoever in this states and on its facts, is inconsistent with earlier
cases holding that there could be no recovery for damage to buildings even
where they did not increase the lateral pressure. 24
The court in Prete v. Cray raises a nice question whether its ruling, allowing
for damages to the buildings and improvements, relates to the matter of right
or remedy, whether it changes the basic liability or affects only the extent of
the recoverable damages. The court contends that its rule is merely one which
applies the general rule that "a wrongdoer must make compensation in damages
for all the direct results of his wrongdoing .... ,,25
Does Prete v. Cray change the fundamental right of lateral support, or does
it merely apply "the general legal principle',' allowing the injured party to recover all consequential damages immediately flowing from the act of wrongdoing? True, as the court states, the damages recoverable under its holding
are immeasurably enlarged, but this concession does not prove that the enhancement of damages i~s unrelated to the essence of the natural right of lateral
support. Consider the language of cases contra which limit the natural right
21. 110 App. Div. 787, 788, 97 N. Y. Supp. 283.
22. See infra, note 28 for the value of judicial affirmance without opinion.
23. In Radcliff's Executors v. The Mayor etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195 (1850) excavation operations in grading a street, conducted by the City of Brooklyn, resulted in the
removal of an embankment which constituted a natural support to adjoining land of the
plaintiff. As a consequence, a portion of the supported land subsided. The court held the
corporation was not liable, and appeared to base its decision upon a denial of any natural
right to lateral support, saying, "Nor will a man be answerable for the consequences of
enjoying his own property in the way such property is usually enjoyed, unless an injury
has resulted to another from the want of proper care or skill on his part." Id. at 200.
But in Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb. 380, aff'd, 21 Barb. 409 (N. Y. 1855) the right to
lateral support was upheld and the Radcliff case was distinguished on the ground that
it involved a municipal corporation engaged in a governmental function and was therefore
not liable for the torts of its agents.
24. Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92 (N. Y. 1819); People ex rel. Barlow v. The Canal
Board, 2 Thomp. & C. 275 (N. Y. 1873). These cases were not expressly overruled; however, the court did discuss whether or not the defendant was liable for damage to the
buildings. The Riley case, however, remains unsatisfactory not because there is uncertainty as to what was held, but because there is uncertainty as to why the court did so
sold. There was no clear cu t discussion of the exact nature and extent of the right of
lateral support, and the recoverability of consequential damages for the breach of that right,
such as was expounded in Prete v. Cray.
25. Prete v. Cray, 49 R. I. 209, 214, 141 Ad. 609, 612 (1928).
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of lateral support to land in its unimproved condition. In Gilmore v. Driscoll, the court said:
"Bdt this right of property is only in the land in its natural condition, and the
damages in such an action are limited to the injury to the land itself, and do not
include any injury to buildings or 'improvements thereon. While each owner may
build upon and improve his own estate at his pleasure, provided he does not infringe
upon the natural right of his neighbor, no one can by his own act enlarge the liability of his neighbor for an interference swith this natural right."26
Thus stated, it appears that the dominant American rule incorporated a
limitation of damages as a part of the property right.27 This limitation cannot
accurately be dismissed as a mere collateral item of damages. True, this restricted right may be indefensible, as is later conceded, but it is highly questionable to define the enhanced recovery as an item determinable by the law
governing consequential damages. The peculiar nature of the common-law right
of lateral support indicates clearly that a limitation of recovery is imposed
as an essential part of this right, whether wisely or unwisely. It seems that the
over-all consequences of Prete v. Cray are to change materially the fundamental
right of natural support by removing the basic qualifications that such right
only applies when and if the land is in an unimproved condition. Whether the
rule of Prete v. Cray smacks of right or remedy, it is concededly a substantial
change, and one that calls for careful consideration before acceptance or
rejection.
Conclusion
While the New York decisions do not appear to be opposed to the principles
of Prete v. Cray, it is not definitely certain that New York would allow a
recovery for injury to buildings caused by the withdrawal of lateral support,
where the buildings in no way increased the lateral pressure. The reason for
this uncertainty is that the Court of Appeals has not as yet made any affirmative and Teasoned statement as to what course it would follow if the question
were squarely presented to it. The Riley case is of doubtful value being
26. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877). (Italics inserted). Accord: Scranton
Coal Co. v. Graff Furnace Co., 289 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); Maellering v. Evans, 121
Ind. 195, 22 N. E. 989 (1889); Cooper v. Altoona Concrete Const. Co., 231 Pa. 557, 80 Ad.
1047 (1911); Triulzi v. Costa, 296 Mass. 24, 4 N. E. (2d) 617 (1936). Cf. "That such
is the true principle-that is, that it is the subsidence and not the pecuniary loss which
grounds the cause of action-is, I think, apparent from those decisions which establish
that, on proof that the weight of a newly erected house has not contributed to the subsidence, its value may be recovered by way of damage consequent on the original injury
in an action against the adjoining owner who has withdrawn the support of the adjacent
land." Collins, J., in Attorney General ex rel. v. Conduit Colliery Co., [1895] 1 Q. B. 301,
312 (1894) quoted in Prete v. Cray, 49 R. I. 209, 214, 141 Ad. 609, 612 (1928).
27. Note, for example, that substantial damage is a necessary incident in the plaintiff's
cause of action. Supra, notes 1, 4.
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affirmed without opinion, 28and therefore, it would not necessarily be followed
by the Court of Appeals.
The problem resolves itself ifito this: since it is not certain whether New
York would follow Prete v. Cray, should New York follow it? The only argument against the application of the rule of this case is the one put forth by
the dissenting judge.2 9 The rationale of this argument is that. by allowing
damages for injuries to buildings, there would be a tendency to discourage the
improvement of land when it adjoined an already improved parcel because of
the increase of the hazard of a large recovery of damages. This is hardly convincing in view of the fact that as the law in the majority of jurisdictions now
stands, the one who first improves his property'bears the risk of the adjacent
owner's excavations, and yet this risk has not deterred landowners from improving their property.30 What difference does it make whether the extraordinary hazard is placed on the excavating owner while he is improving his
property (as in Prete v. Cray), or it is assumed by the adjoining owner alter
he has improved his property (as in Gilmore v. Driscoll).
Certainly, when we view the principle of the instant case in the light of effecting justice between the parties, there can be no doubt that *this view is the
28. "Affirmance by this court without opinion does not mean that we have adopted
the opinion of the court below in its entirety." Adrico Realty Corp. v. New York, 250
N. Y. 29, 44, 164 N. E. 732, 737 (1928). "Two decisions in the former General Term are
cited by the adverse parties at bar. They are in conflict, but, although the actual determination of one was affirmed without opinion by this court [Court of Appeals], neither
controls the rule to be applied by us. [Citations omitted]. We are free to accept or reject
the argument of either opinion." Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N. Y. 241, 245, 181 N. E.
464, 466 (1932). For.a discussion of this subject see: Marcus, Affirmance Without Opinion
(1937) 6 FoRDHAm L. REV. 212.
29. Rathbun, J., dissenting in Prete v. Cray, 49 R. I. 209, 217, 141 AtI. 609, 613 (1928).
30. Several states have enacted statutes requiring the excavator to give the adjoining
landowner adequate notice of the proposed operations so that he may take the proper steps
to protect his property. Ohio Code (Throckmorton, 1940) §§ 3782, 3783; S. D. Comp.
Laws (1939) § 51.0702; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 5354. An arbitrary excavation-depth
has been set by some statutes at which point the loss in building damage shifts from the
building owner to the excavator. Cal. Civ. Code (1941) § 832 (12 ft.); Ohio Code (Throckmorton, 1940) §§ 3782 (9 ft); N. J. S. A. (1940) 46:10-1 (8 ft). The problem becomes
more acute in the larger cities because of the proximity of the building. In several cities
excavation-depths have been regulated by local ordinance. An example of this type of
legislation is the local ordinance of the City of New York which provides that the adjoining landowner must protect his own building if the excavation is ten feet or less in depth,
and if more than ten feet deep then the excavator must be afforded a license to enter upon
the adjoining land and protect the building; or if no license is afforded, the adjoining
landowner must protect his own building. Administrative Code of the City of New York
(1937)

§ C26-385.0 subd. a-b. See also Cleveland Mun. Code, 1924, § 1535 (C) (d)

(9 ft.); Los Angeles Mun. Code, 1936, § 91,149 (12 ft.) ; Pittsburgh Mun. Dig., 1938, § 923(2)
(15 ft). See PowELL, CAsEs oN PossEssoRy EsTATES 381 et seq. (2d ed. 1943).,

